Most global energy models are developed by institutes from developed countries, focusing primarily on issues that are important in industrialised countries. Evaluating the results for Asia of the IPCC/SRES models shows that broad concepts of energy and development, the Energy Ladder and the Environmental Kuznets Curve, can be observed in the results of the models. However, improvements can be made in modelling the issues that underlie these concepts, like traditional fuels, electrification, economic structural change, income distribution and informal economies. Given the rapidly growing importance of energy trajectories of developing countries for global sustainability, the challenge for the future is to develop energy models that include all these aspects of energy and development.
Introduction
The consumption and production of energy worldwide plays a major role in several sustainability problems, such as climate change and depletion of resources. So far, world energy use has been dominated by energy consumption in industrialised countries. However, that situation is currently changing. Industrialisation, improvement of living standards and population growth are leading to rapidly increasing energy consumption in developing countries, with subsequent impacts on global sustainability issues.
Global energy models are used to explore and understand possible future changes in the global energy system. Only very few global energy models account explicitly for the specific dynamics of developing countries. As the majority is developed in industrialised countries, they mainly focus on issues that are important for industrialised energy systems, systems that can be characterised by full access to modern energy forms, high (and increasing) welfare levels and a minor role of agriculture in the structure of the economy. Implicitly, it is assumed that the future of developing countries can be derived from experiences in developed countries during the last decades. For a variety of reasons, this is not necessarily the case, as developed and developing countries differ for instance in market development, institutional arrangements and the existence of traditional economies and energy systems (Shukla, 1995; Pandey, 2002) .
In 2000, the IPCC published a set of scenarios in the Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (IPCC, 2000a; IPCC, 2000b) . These scenarios have been developed using global energy models, to explore future pathways for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Despite the fact that developing countries play an important role in the increase in global energy consumption projected in these scenarios, all modelling teams in the SRES were from the developed world (the number of global energy modelling teams in developing countries is very limited). It should be noted that in the SRES some attempts were made to compensate for this: one modelling team involved modellers from developing countries, while the report as a whole involved several experts from developing countries as non-modelling experts. However, these activities did not change the models that were applied.
This article looks at the question whether current global energy models include several key issues of energy systems in developing countries. In this analysis, the focus is especially on the Asian region. It is first evaluated whether two broad concepts of energy and development, the Energy Ladder and the Environmental Kuznets Curve, can be found in the SRES model results (Chapter 2.2). Next, several key issues of energy systems in developing countries are identified that are relevant for global energy models. Chapter 2.3 discusses these issues, focusing on the trends and stylised facts and the relevance for global energy models. Chapter 2.4 discusses the methods and gives the conclusions.
Some notes on this study have to be made beforehand. First, completeness of the key issues is not claimed; the focus is on what is considered the most relevant changes in energy systems in developing countries with respect to global energy modelling, based on this own analysis and observation. Second, the focus is mainly on Asia, as among all developing regions this continent has the largest population size, experiences the fastest economic growth and consequently the fastest growing contribution to energy consumption and global climate change.
Many definitions exist for the terms -developing country‖ and -developing region‖. In this article, developing countries are defined as all countries within the World Bank's low income, lower-middle and upper-middle income groups, excluding the former Soviet regions and Central-European countries (or, in other words, all countries in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania that are not in the high income class). The terms developing country and developing region are used interchangeably.
Metrics for the comparison of economic activity
Most energy models use economic activity (GDP/capita, representing living standards) as driving force for energy related issues. When internationally comparing economic activity, one has to express local currencies in a common currency. Two options are available for such comparison: market exchange rates (MER, usually US dollars) or purchasing power parity (PPP, expressed as international dollars). MER comparison is based on bilateral exchange rates between different currencies and the US dollar, but this ignores the often large differences in prices of a broad set of goods and services that are not reflected in the value of the exchange rate. The PPP exchange rate is defined as the ratio of prices for a representative basket of goods and services, such that the purchasing power of the currencies is equal (Lafrance and Schembri, 2002) . Usually, North American purchasing power in US dollars is set to equal international dollars. Developing countries are usually characterised by a high ratio between PPP income levels and MER-based income levels (the so-called PPP-ratio), which makes the issue especially relevant for the modelling of energy systems in these regions. In other words, developing countries' economies are larger on PPP basis than suggested on MER basis. In the SRES, economic activity was mainly expressed in MER terms and this has been extensively debated in long-term scenario literature (Castles and Henderson, 2003; Grübler et al., 2004; van Vuuren and Alfsen, 2006; Nordhaus, 2007) . In the dynamic context of global models, one of the crucial questions is whether PPP values should be regarded as constant or dynamically converging with increasing welfare levels (van Vuuren and Alfsen, 2006) . Although it was found that models lead to comparable results if calibrated consistently in PPP or MER (van Vuuren and Alfsen, 2006) , this aspect contributes to uncertainty in the projection for energy use in developing countries. In this article, MER values are used in the discussion of the SRES results (Chapter 2.2) and PPP values for the analysis of data (Chapter 2.3), as PPP is more suitable for the comparison of welfare levels between different developing countries. The different use of metrics in these two chapters is irrelevant for the type of comparisons that are made.
Developing countries in global energy models
One of the few consistent databases with scenario results from global energy models is the IPCC/SRES (IPCC, 2000b) . Due to differences in regional definitions and levels of detail of the models, the reporting of model results in this database is rather rough and at a high level of aggregation. For example, results are published for only four world regions (of which the focus is on the region of Asia 2 ) and a limited set of socio-economic and energy data. Due to these limitations, it is only possible to evaluate these models on rather aggregated concepts of energy and development. Here, the focus is on the Energy Ladder and the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC).
The six models involved in the IPCC/SRES process are AIM, ASF, IMAGE/TIMER, MARIA, MESSAGE and MiniCAM ( IPCC, 2000a; IPCC, 2000b) . In the IPCC/SRES, a set of four scenarios was developed, defined by an axis of global versus regional orientation and economic versus environmental preferences. The A1 storyline is a case of rapid globalisation and economic development, in which average income per capita converges between world regions. The A2 scenario represents a differentiated world with a focus on materialism, in which protectionism of regions is more important than global interaction and in which significant income disparities continue to exist. The B1 storyline describes a fast-changing and convergent world, aiming at environmental, social and economic sustainability from a global perspective. Finally, the B2 world is one of increased concern for environmental and social sustainability coupled with an emphasis on regional solutions ( IPCC, 2000a; IPCC, 2000b) . Per scenario one model is the marker model, which is illustrative of a particular storyline. On several keyvariables, the results of other models are harmonised with the marker model.
In this analysis, all data are derived from the IPCC/SRES website 3 except for the IMAGE-model data: these are from the IMAGE SRES implementation CD-ROM (IMAGEteam, 2001 ). Ideally, the source-codes and technical documentation of the models should have analysed with respect to specific development issues. However, documentation of many of these models is incomplete and source codes are hard to obtain. Therefore, it was decided to use the results of the models and the available model documentation. By limiting this evaluation to these models, there is awareness that a range of specific energy models are excluded, among them the MARKAL/TIMES family and the IEA World Energy Model (WEM), which were not involved in the IPCC/SRES process. Also, the SRES versions of the models might be outdated as models are continuously improved. For example, the IMAGE model has been considerably improved since the SRES (Bouwman et al., 2006) , but no changes have been made to the processes that are relevant for energy and development issues. Also for other models it is presumed that little has changed on the issues discussed in Chapter 2.3. Finally, it should be noted that data in the chapters are often presented as function of per capita income, an indicator used as a proxy of development level 4 .
The Energy Ladder in the SRES models
It is a general historically observed pattern that once fuels become available and affordable, populations switch to fuel-stove combinations with a higher quality (Holdren and Smith, 2000) . The Energy Ladder is a generic concept that postulates that household energy use often shows transitions from traditional biomass fuels (wood, dung, crop residues) through direct use of liquid and solid fossil fuels (coal, kerosene) to modern energy forms (LPG, natural gas and electricity) (Smith et al., 1994; Barnes and Floor, 1996; Martins, 2005) . Higher ranked fuels on the Energy Ladder generally tend to be cleaner, more efficient and easy to use, although a switch from traditional fuels to coal is not always an improvement in this sense. On the other hand, capital costs and dependence on centralised fuel cycles also tend to increase. Critiques of the Energy Ladder state that reality is more complex than a simple transitionsal theory, for instance, because the pattern is not observed as a sequence and it is driven by more factors than increasing income (Masera et al., 2000; Martins, 2005) . Especially issues like household size and location (urban, rural) and availability of wood resources are often found to influence a households' behavior with respect to the Energy Ladder (Hosier and Dowd, 1987; Kituyi et al., 2001; Brouwer and Falcao, 2004; Top et al., 2004) .
To compare the Energy Ladder hypothesis and the results of the SRES models, the fraction of non-commercial fuels and electricity in secondary energy use is used. According to the concept, energy use should move from traditional fuels towards kerosene and electricity. Figure 3 shows the fraction of non-commercial fuels in secondary energy use for the four SRES scenarios. Only three of the six SRES models report the use of non-commercial fuels (see also  Table 6 ). Generally, the AIM, IMAGE and MESSAGE models project a decreasing share of non-commercial fuels, following an (exogenously determined) exponentially declining path with increasing income levels. However, large differences exist between the models. In the AIM model, non-commercial fuels are rapidly phased out at income level of 6,000-10,000 US$/capita, while the IMAGE model still shows a share of about 10% at 12,000 US$/capita. Figure 4 shows the fraction of electricity in secondary energy use in relation to income for the region of Asia. All IPCC/SRES models project an increasing share of electricity with increasing income. However, large differences on path and share exist between models. The MiniCAM model projects the highest share of electricity, up to 60% in the A2 scenario. On the other extreme, the MARIA model projects hardly any increase in electricity share, in none of the A1, B1 and B2 scenarios it exceeds 15%
5 . The results also show diversity in the rate of growth of the electricity share; especially the ASF A2 scenario involves rapid developments. The results of all IPCC/SRES models for Asia involve patterns that correspond typically with the Energy Ladder concept: decreasing shares of traditional fuels and increasing shares of electricity use. However, in reality each rung on the ladder is related to specific processes and driving forces. For instance, the transitions from traditional to commercial fuels has to do with income, household size and wood or fuel availability; the choice between different commercial fuels is influenced by subsidies and taxes and the investment cost for related equipment; and the use of electricity is only possible once households are connected to the grid, or have stand-alone electricity production. These issues, especially traditional fuels and electrification, are often not explicitly incorporated in the global energy models (see Table 1 ). 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve in the SRES models
The concept of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) generalises empirical observations of environmental pressure with economic development as an inverted U-shapedcurve, analogous to the income inequality curve described by Kuznets (Kuznets, 1955) . Based on the concept of the EKC, it is often agued that environmental pressure will decrease once developing countries become more prosperous (Stern, 2004) . Beside the observation that the statistical basis for the EKC is weak and many definitions are used to indicate environmental pressure (absolute (kg), per capita (kg/cap) or intensity (kg/$)) critics question its value for projections of developing countries and urge to focus on a decomposition of the underlying processes that drive this generic concept (Stern, 2004; Focacci, 2005) . For instance, Focacci (2005) found that the EKC does not hold for developing regions and explained this from the heterogeneous income distribution, large presence of poor regions, prevailing rural lifestyle and economic and social barriers to the widespread adaptation of technologies.
Two environmental pressure indicators are used to analyse the EKC in the results of the IPCC/SRES models: sulfur and carbon emissions per capita. For sulfur emissions, there is a generic trend in all models to follow an EKC, although the turning point of the inverted U-shape is different ( Figure 5 ). The wide variations between the models, even though income, population and energy use projections were coordinated with the marker model, can be explained from different structures in the energy systems (mainly the applied technologies/fuels) or exogenous assumptions on emission intensity. In the A1, B1 and A2 scenarios, the ASF model has the highest SOx emissions, which can be explained from the model's strong focus on coal (van der Figure 6 shows the carbon emissions results of the SRES models. In this figure, the upper limit of the income axis was increased, because the results seem to suggest that carbon emission projections could be following an EKC-type of trajectory in the model projections, although with a higher turning point than SO 2 . Also for carbon emissions, wide variations exist between models and scenarios. In the A2 scenario, the top of the EKC is not reached in the 21 st century, in the B1 scenario the turning point of the EKC is well below 10,000 US$/capita. The ASF model shows the highest carbon emissions in all scenarios, which can be explained from its focus on coal. The AIM model also projects a high share of coal, and thus relatively high CO 2 emissions in regionalising scenarios. Very low-carbon emissions are projected by the MARIA model, due to the substantial amount of nuclear energy projected here (IPCC, 2000b; van der Sluijs et al., 2001) .
Generally, all model results show the inverted U-shape of the EKC in the A1 and B1 scenarios. Higher turning points for the A2 and B2 scenarios were also found in an analysis of the EKC in the IPCC/SRES models at the global level (Fonkych and Lempert, 2005) . The SRES results of the A1 and B1 scenarios show an EKC pattern for CO 2 emissions, although carbon mitigation policies were explicitly excluded from the scenarios. For SOx emissions, industrialised countries have restrictive policies since the 1970s and end-of-pipe technologies are widely applied. Diffusion of these policies and technologies towards developing countries takes place and is expected to continue (Grubler, 2002; Smith et al., 2005) .
Also for the EKC, the underlying processes that determine whether developing countries follow the EKC, e.g. heterogeneous income distribution, rural-urban divide or socio-economic barriers (Focacci, 2005) , are not explicitly modelled in global energy models (see Table 1 ).
Key issues of energy systems in developing countries
Based on the analysis of the model results with respect to the Energy Ladder and the EKC, three groups of key issues can be distinguished that were less relevant for energy systems in industrialised regions (in recent history), but are of importance for today's developing countries. First, key issues in the energy system itself are the use of traditional fuels and limited access to modern energy (electrification), both related to the Energy Ladder. A second group of issues, involving structural change, income distribution and the role of the informal economy, has a more socio-economic nature and is related to the demand for energy. A third group of issues is related to the context of development for present-day developing countries compared to Western regions after 1960 and involves depletion of resources, climate change and local air pollution. A final issue is the difference between urban and rural areas. Most global energy models do not make a differentiation between urban and rural energy systems, although for most of the above identified key issues, urban and rural characteristics are different. Therefore, this is discussed together with the key issues below. Are these key issues incorporated in the IPCC/SRES models? This question was assessed qualitatively, based on the IPCC/SRES report (IPCC, 2000a; IPCC, 2000b) , the available model documentation from the time of the SRES (Mori, 2000; de Vries et al., 2001; Kainuma et al., 2003) and an overview of the SRES models structure (van der Sluijs et al., 2001 ) (see Table 1 ). Below, it is elaborated on the key issues, evaluate whether and how they are incorporated in the SRES models and discuss their relevance for global energy models.
MODELS
2.3.1 Developments in the energy system 2.3.1.1 From traditional to commercial fuels
Traditional biomass, such as fuel wood, dung, agricultural waste, crop residues and charcoal constitute a major source of energy in the developing world. In 2000, 52% of the total population of developing countries relied on traditional biomass as the main source of energy for cooking and heating (IEA, 2002) . Traditional biomass combustion causes indoor air pollution which triggers various adverse health effects and an estimated 1.6 million deaths per year (WHO, 2006) . Another issue is the availability of fuel wood and its impact on deforestation (Arnold et al., 2006) .
Data and stylised facts
Official statistics on fuel wood include only production, not consumption (FAO, 2005) (but they can easily be considered equal). Unfortunately, however, the reliability of statistics on this topic can be questioned, as most fuel wood is gathered from woodlands and never accounted for in statistics. Another data problem concerning traditional fuel is that global statistic databases account only for fuel wood, not for other forms of traditional biomass; dung, agricultural waste and crop residues are only taken into account by survey studies (FAO, 2005; Xiaohua and Zhenmin, 2005) .
Given these caveats, the available data show a generally decreasing trend in fuel wood production per capita with increasing income levels in all world regions and several Asian countries ( Figure 7 and Figure 8 , left graphs). Sub-Saharan Africa also shows a decline in per capita fuel wood production in time, although it faced a decreasing GDP/capita (PPP) in the described period, indicating the relevance of other drivers than income. In contrast to per capita fuel wood production, absolute production increased in most world regions and in most Asian countries ( Figure Many studies exist on fuel switching and its relation to socio-economic development. Usually, a decreasing use of traditional fuels in relative measures is observed: per capita, but also as share of total energy use. An extensive data analysis was performed by Victor and Victor (2000) . They found that declining fuel wood use can statistically mainly be explained from several factors: changes in income, differences in availability, degree of urbanisation and industrialisation. Besides these main drivers, other factors that determine the use of traditional biomass are the costs of this energy source (for example costs for feedstock, conversion or alternative fuels), culture and traditions, climate, geography and land use. Culture and tradition are often ignored in energy modelling, as cultural habits are hard to quantify. The relation between income and fuel wood use may be better understood when income distribution is taken into account, as fuel wood is mainly used by lower income households (Victor and Victor, 2002) .
Relevance for global energy models
Only three of the IPCC/SRES models report the use of traditional fuels, two of them using a non-described method (Table 1) . This means that the models ignore an essential element of the energy system, potentially underestimating the demand for energy. Although in terms of global energy use traditional fuels are not very important, there are several reasons to include them in global energy models. First, they constitute a substantial part of energy use in developing countries, especially relevant for people in rural areas. Second, they are not easily replaced as transport and distribution of alternative fuels are expensive in rural areas and cultural habits play a major role. Third, the contrast between declining per capita use and increasing total production of fuel wood in many regions relates to pressure on forests, feedbacks from shortages and a fuel wood crisis (see e.g. (Arnold et al., 2006) . Global energy models could provide added value in this discussion, if they would link demand and supply of fuel wood and identify areas where problems might arise. Finally, the importance of traditional energy use for health issues and climate change is another reason to include this fuel type in the models.
Electrification
In the industrialised world almost every house is connected to the electricity grid, whereas in developing regions 64% of the population had access to electricity in 2000 (IEA, 2002) . In residential energy use, a major difference exists between urban and rural areas; in urban areas electricity is often the predominant type of energy while rural areas depend more on traditional fuels (Figure 9 and (Goldemberg, 2000; Reddy, 2000) ). Many remote villages, especially those in mountainous areas, are not connected to a central electricity grid.
Data and stylised facts
Data on electrification are scarce and their usefulness is limited as definitions for ‗access to electricity' differ per country (IEA, 2002) . The data from the World Energy Outlook (2002) was used to analyse stylised facts in the relation between development and electrification. This data strongly suggests that the higher the income, the higher the electrification rates. In fact, the electrification rate increases fast initially and then slows down as only remote areas are left to be electrified (see Figure 9 and 10). Often, a positive feed-back loop is assumed between increased income and growing electricity rates. Increasing income levels lead to an increase of electrification rates, and investments in the electricity sector. At the same time, access to electricity allows to increase income generation as working and manufacturing are possible after dark. Also, more efficient electric machinery and equipment can be used leading to an overall increase in productivity and income. The last proposition does not necessarily needs to hold: first, many electrification projects do not offer further service or maintenance after the projects end, wiping out the advantages of electrification (Mulugetta et al., 2000) . Second, access to electricity is only one of many barriers for economic development; market development and access, financial services (credit) and client's willingness to pay for quality products are also of importance for small manufacturing enterprises (Kooijman, 2005) . 
Relevance for global energy models
As far as could be extracted from documentation of the IPCC/SRES models none of the models deals explicitly with electrification processes (Table 1) 6 . These models implicitly assume that increasing electrification rates are included in the increasing demand for electricity with rising economic activity. This is not necessarily incorrect, but it increases uncertainty of projections for the level of energy demand in developing countries. Electrification (especially if interpreted as grid-expansion) influences primary energy use, since grid or non-grid electricity is generated by different technologies. Non-grid electricity is typically from small-scale renewable energy or oil generators and grid-delivered electricity is from large-scale sources; coal, gas, nuclear. Secondly, the electrification process (grid expansion) is a very capital intensive process 6 Research on more recent technical documentation and a questionnaire addressed by the model developers indicates that in MESSAGE and MiniCAM electrification is modelled explicitly (chapter 3). 
From economic development to energy use 2.3.2.1 Economic structural change and dematerialisation
It is often observed that the nature of economic value added and employment shifts during the development of economies. Typically, developing economies are characterised by a large share of the population working in agriculture (see Figure 11 , left graph). Historically, developing countries that changed into an industrial economy did this by increasing the production of labour intensive export products. Taiwan, Singapore, Korea and Hong Kong are historic examples; nowadays China and India show a similar pattern. In a later stage the share of the service sector increases in value added and employment. This stage has been observed in developed economies, during the second half of the 20 th century. This description of economic structural changes is highly stylised, and it is questionable whether it can be directly applied for individual countries (Jung et al., 2000) . Criticism on this concept is recently formulated by historic economists, mainly regarding the shift towards the service sector. For Sweden it was found that, when measured in constant prices per sector, the share of the service sector has been fairly constant over the last two centuries, while the share of industry increased at the expense of the agricultural sector (Kander, 2005) . Also, India has a noteably high share of services (see Figure 12 ; Vries et al., 2007) , which influences the prospects for scenario development. Another reason why developing country development might be different is that the decline in the industrial sector in developed countries is partly caused by a replacement of (heavy) industry from high to low income countries. Such -outsourcing‖ of industry can obviously not be reproduced by countries that currently have the lowest income levels. A concept that can be related to economic structural change is the long-term trend of dematerialisation. The theory of dematerialisation can be summarised in two elements: 1) the intensity of use (in kg/$) of a given material follows a similar pattern for all economies, first increasing with per capita GDP, reaching a maximum and than declining (see Figure 11 , right graph); 2) the maximum intensity of use declines the later in time it is attained by a given economy (Bernardini and Galli, 1993) . Beside structural change, this pattern is often explained from technical improvements that decrease material input, substitution of new materials with better properties, saturation of bulk markets for basic materials and government regulations (Cleveland and Ruth, 1998) . The strength of this concept is its simplicity, the weakness is that technologies and material substitution do not necessarily depend primarily on per capita income and that it does not include the relevant driving forces (van Vuuren et al., 1999) . The question is whether these patterns hold true for the future of developing regions. These regions may catch up with new, less material-and energy intensive technology (leapfrogging) or show different patterns of economic structural change. One indication that this might happen is that countries which developed their industry and energy system in the 20 th century show lower CO 2 intensity curves than earlier industrialised countries, due to leapfrogging over the carbon intensive coal-period (Lindmark, 2004) .
Data and stylised facts
Data analysis for the period 1975-2000 shows that, on average, low-income economies depend largely on agriculture, middle income countries have a relatively high share of industry and high income countries have a high share of services ( Figure 12 , left graph). However, in all income classes the share of industry decreases and services increases. Energy intensity decreases in all classes, which is likely to be related to both the rising share of services and improvements in energy efficiency. At the same time, the values for value added and energy intensity of the two major Asian developing countries, China and India, are completely different (Figure 13 ). By 2000, the Indian GDP was for more than 50% based on services, while China relied for 50% on industry. Energy intensity decreased in both countries, in China faster than in India, although the energy intensity for India is already relatively low compared to other low-income countries (see Figure 12) . Differences in the energy intensity of the total economy can not only be explained from different economic structures; because for instance the applied technologies, policies, climate differences and population density play also a role.
Relevance for global energy models
Economic structural change and energy intensity play a major role in energy demand projections, but differences between countries make it hard to apply these concepts in general in global energy models. All IPCC/SRES models distinguish several economic sectors and therefore it is likely that some form of structural change is included by applying sector-specific economic drivers for energy use (Table 1) . However, the agriculture sector, which is dominant in economic terms in most developing regions and uses electricity for irrigation, is seldom explicitly modelled. Also, changes in energy intensity within economic sectors are only included in some models, see for example the TIMER model (de Vries et al., 2001 ). China India
Income distribution
A difference between developed and developing countries is the distribution of income over the population. Developing countries tend to have a more unequal income distribution, indicating a division in societies between rich elites and poor masses. The classical concept is that with increasing economic development, income inequality would initially increase and, after a top-level, decrease (Kuznets, 1955) . Since 1955, studies have been published that reject, affirm or discuss this stylised fact of increasing and decreasing income inequality (see e.g. Saith, 1983; Glomm, 1997) . 
Data and stylised facts
Data on income inequality are scarce. The Gini coefficient was used in the World Bank WDI (World Bank, 2004 ) as a numerical measure for the degree of inequality of income 7 . It appears that income distribution generally tends to become more equal with increasing GDP/capita (Figure 14) . However, a stylised function for this development, like a Kuznets curve, cannot be extracted from these data. What can be noted, though, is that developing countries have a much higher variation in income distribution than developed countries.
Relevance for global energy models
Income distribution is not incorporated in the SRES models (see Table 1 ). Energy demand is mostly modelled as a function of the average GDP per capita and changes in income distribution (e.g. the development of a middle class and matching lifestyle) are not necessarily 7 It is determined from two elements: 1) the Lorenz curve which ranks the empirical distribution of a variable and 2) the line of perfect equality in which each element has the same contribution to the total summation of the values of a variable (see e.g. Cypher and Dietz, 1997). Here, the Gini coefficient is given as a percentage and has values between zero (perfect equality) and 100 (perfect inequality). reflected in this indicator. Initial research indicates that income distribution could be an important factor in transport energy demand but more research is needed to explore this topic for long-term global energy modelling (Storchmann, 2005) . In this respect, it is important to realise that independent modelling of high and low income groups may result in very different dynamic behavior than suggested by the averages (see Van Vuuren et al., 1999 for example with high and low income regions). A tentative indication is that models that ignore income distribution differences in developing countries tend to underestimate energy behavior that is typically related to low-or high income groups, e.g. the use of traditional energy or the electricity and transport behavior of high income households. A complicating factor for including income distribution in energy modelling is the availability and quality of data. Long-term time series are rare, measuring is not consistent and future projections are not provided by macro-economic models. Another pitfall is the possible interference with other developments, like urbanisation and decreasing household size. However, it could be worthwhile to attempt as it adds a new dynamic process to global energy models; the available data provide a starting-point and future assumptions can be part of a scenario storyline.
Informal economic systems
Most energy models use GDP per capita as a driver for energy use. Apart from the issue of the underestimation of economies of developing countries using market-exchange rate data (which can be solved by using PPP data), GDP may still not be a good indicator for the energy intensity of activities, as developing countries have a large informal sector. This informal economy involves the unofficial transactions that take place in the real world, but that are not reflected in official economic descriptions. It is a broad concept, for which different scientists use different definitions, including or excluding illegal activities, tax evasion and monetary and non-monetary transactions (Schneider, 2005) . The main ‗drivers' for the informal economy appear to be the tax burden and social security contributions, the intensity of regulations, social transfer systems, overregulation and high cost on the official labour market (Schneider and Enste, 2000) . Informal economies exist all over the world, but in developing countries the informal economy usually forms a much larger share of the total economy (Kahn and Pfaff, 2000; Chaudhuri et al., 2006) : on average in 1999-2000 41% of the total official GDP, against an average of 17% in OECD-countries (Schneider, 2005) .
Data and stylised facts
The main problem of informal transactions is that they are hard to measure; data have to be derived from indirect indicators. Several methods exist to assess the size of the informal economy. The direct approach uses surveys and samples, but its reliability might be weak. Indirect methods use discrepancies between several statistics, for instance between national expenditures and income statistics. More advanced methods use the expected amount of transactions in the economy or look into the physical input of the economy (e.g. electricity) as an indicator for the real economic activity. The DYMIMIC model approach (Schneider, 2005) uses multiple input and output indicators to estimate and explain the size of the informal economy. regions: 1990 regions: /1991 regions: , 1994 regions: /1995 regions: and 1999 regions: /2000 regions: , for OECD regions: 1989 regions: /1990 regions: , 1994 regions: /1995 regions: , 1997 regions: /1998 regions: and 1999 regions: /2000 . Figure 15 shows estimations of the size of the informal economy for a global set of countries, clustered in world regions. Also on a country basis, estimations for OECD countries are generally much lower and show less variation than developing countries (as indicated by the arrows). Over time, the size of the shadow economy increased in all countries during the 1990s, also the OECD countries. This may be a consequence of increasing burdens of taxation and social security payments, combined with rising state regulatory activities (Schneider, 2005; Schneider, 2006) .
Relevance for global energy models
The existence of informal economic systems is of importance for global energy modelling as it indicates that the official economic activity (GDP/capita), often used as driving force for energy demand, does not reflect actual economic activity. Usually, the actual economic activity is higher, indicating a different relation between economic activity and energy demand. The cross-country observation of a declining informal economy with increasing income (arrows in Figure 15 ) indicates a process of ‗formalising' the economy. If informal activities are formalised, the official economic growth is artificially high and energy intensity (in GJ per official dollar) decreases rapidly. See for example Figure 13 , in which China and India show rapidly declining energy intensities; this might also be explained from formalisation (or monetisation) of the economy. As energy intensity numbers are often interpreted in terms of energy efficiency, estimates for improvement in developing countries might be overestimated.
Informal economic systems are not included in the SRES models (see Table 6 ). Clearly, there is a relationship between the discussion on the correct metric of GDP data (PPP versus MER, see introduction) and the size of the informal economy. One possible explanation of the 
The context of development
An implicit assumption of many global energy models is that the future of developing regions can be derived from experiences during the last decades in industrialised regions. This focus on only the recent past of industrialised regions (for practical reasons), unfortunately implies that potentially valuable information from the times that Western countries were at the economic activity level (but not technology level) of present-day developing countries is not often used to develop insights in developing countries trends. Above, some characteristics of energy systems and socio-economic developments are discussed that mark the difference between developed and developing regions. A final series of issues is related to the context in which energy systems are developing: depletion of fossil resources, climate change and local air pollution. These issues are not unique for developing regions (high energy prices and air pollution were also relevant for Western countries in the 19 th century) but they might drive energy systems in developing countries in a different direction than industrialised regions since 1960. Generally, these issues are more elaborately included in global energy models than the issues discussed before (see Table 1 ).
Fossil energy resource depletion
The issue of resource depletion and increasing energy costs is included in all SRES models, mostly based on a single fossil resource assessment (Rogner, 1997) (see Table 1 ). This is the most straightforward impact of resource depletion: some energy sources become more expensive upon depletion, causing a shift towards competitive alternatives. A second impact is the feedback of rising long-term energy costs (or at least a break with the long-term decline) on economic development, a process that can only be modelled in integrated energy-economy models (many of the SRES models are partial equilibrium models and do not capture this feedback). The question here is whether experiences during the oil crisis can be used to model expected future depletion of fossil resources. It should be noted that as oil-importing developing countries have a higher energy intensity, they are much more vulnerable to energy price increases than Western countries (Lucon et al., 2006; Srivastava and Misra, 2007) . At the same time, long-term economic history shows that energy prices were also relatively high during the early stages of economic development in Western countries (Kander, 2002) ; this period might provide valuable lessons to global energy models.
Climate change
Historically, climate change has hardly had any impact on the development of energy systems, both in developing and industrialised regions. However, since energy use is responsible for the majority of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change is expected to influence economic development (O'Brien et al., 2004; Halsnaes et al., 2007) , it becomes a relevant issue for energy systems in developing countries. Climate change can have two major impacts on the development of the energy system. One is that changes in climate can lead to changes in energy demand projections (e.g. higher cooling demand) or to constraints in energy production (e.g. operational requirements in power plants). A much more relevant impact, however, is the impact of climate policy on energy system development. Model studies stress the importance of involving developing countries in international climate policy -in order to avoid high costs and to keep ambitious climate policy targets attainable (e.g. van Vuuren et al., 2007) . However, as energy technologies with low or zero greenhouse gas emissions are usually more expensive than their fossil fuel alternatives this raises the issue who will pay for these additional costs. At the moment, the position of developing countries in international negotiations is that the additional burden of climate policy would damage their abilities for development. Current models are in principle well equipped to assess the additional costs of mitigation trajectories, also on a regional basis (including different proposals for differentiation of commitments among developed and developing countries). There are, however, open issues with respect to additional implementation barriers (e.g. information, risk) in developing countries that are poorly captured by these models. In any case, climate policy might put developing (and developed) countries on a different trajectory than observed historically.
Urban air pollution
One of the major present-day energy-related problems in developing countries is urban air pollution. During the Industrial Revolution, Western countries also suffered from urban air pollution (Mosley, 2001 ) and more recently other forms of regional air pollution (e.g. acidification). Especially in the last decades, these problems have been solved using end-of-pipe technology for sulfur emissions, volatile organic compounds and nitrous oxides. Since most of these technologies are affordable and available in developing regions, this issue alone might not be very decisive on the future development of energy systems. However, if combined with climate policy (e.g. van Vuuren et al., 2006) or if renewable energy is promoted as a solution (e.g. Boudri et al., 2002) , urban air pollution can benefit from other developments in the energy system that have an impact on the energy system structure. Interestingly, the link could also work the other way around. While historically, end-of-pipe solutions have been favored, integrated consideration of both air pollution and climate policy objectives, could lead to a preference for energy efficiency and low-greenhouse gas energy supply options driven primarily by the desire to reduce health impacts of air pollution (Bollen et al., 2007) .
Discussion and conclusion
This article discussed the handling of developing countries in energy-climate models, suggesting that given the increasing importance of developing countries, these models might need to be reformulated to better capture the dynamics of developing country energy systems. The need of focus meant that this paper focused on only a selection of the issues that are relevant in this context. Other key issues like development of infrastructure or technology leapfrogging could have been discussed as well. Also examples of only a limited set of models (the IPCC/SRES models) have been used as they represented a useful consistent scenario database. Of course the choice of models influences the results, but to this experience most discussed issues are not well captured in other global energy models either. Most data used in this article are derived from global databases: the World Bank WDI, the FAO statistical database, the IEA world energy outlook. These data are harmonised and comparable between countries, but insight in the reliability and collecting methods is generally weak. Finally, global energy models are (also) used to support a wide range of policy-making and weakness in modelling the energy systems of developing countries might lead to inaccuracies in policy-making. However, it is at this stage not possible to speculate about what the inclusion of the developing country issues in global energy models would mean for the results. Many of these issues have implications that work in two directions, both increasing and decreasing energy use and GHG emissions.
In this study, it was found that the results of the IPCC/SRES global energy models for Asia are consistent with general -energy development‖ theories such as the Environmental Kuznets Curve and the Energy Ladder. Although some of the driving forces behind these concepts are already included in these models, several improvements for example on traditional fuel use, electrification, structural change, income distribution, the informal economy and a feedback of climate change on the economy, can increase their credibility for changes in the energy systems of developing countries.
The modelling of traditional energy, which is currently only done in three of the SRES models, can be improved by including wood-supply. This could be linked to forestation policies and health policies related to indoor air pollution. Explicitly accounting for electrification might improve the quality of projections on energy demand and technology choices for electricity generation. This could be related to electrification policies and the role of off-grid (renewable) energy systems. Economic structural change seems to be included in all SRES models, but the agriculture sector is not explicitly modelled. Modelling income distribution and rural/urban differences can give more insight in the impact of different lifestyles. Establishing a relation between different income groups, their behavior towards energy use and linking this to incomerelated energy pricing could be useful. Modelling the role of the informal economy might be useful, but seems not possible with current knowledge. Modelling the impacts of climate policy and climate change on the economy could be valuable to enhance insight in suitable GHG reduction mechanisms and their full effects.
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